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Summary:
Questions of morality and ethics - good and evIl - have not been anthropological favourites. Such
issues have been addressed within certain applied environments as well as currently within
American cultural anthropology, but more generally they seem to have been pushed aside within a
basically very relativist discipline. Global problems like ethnocide, military rule and occupation,
accompanied by - or perhaps spurred by - a truly international arms trade, do not appear to have
shaken social anthropology out of its insistence on morality being studied in Its Iocal context. This
paper concludes that such an approach to morality is partly dishonest, limIts the scope of our
discipline, and serves to make us peripheral in an increasingly global discourse on morality and
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But why is it assumed that when
anthrop010gists enter the strugg1e we must
inevitab1y bow out of anthrop010gy? Since
when is evil exempt from human rea1ity?
Why do anthrop010gists so steadfastly refuse
to stare back at it, to speak truth to its
power? What are we passive1y waiting for?
(Scheper-Hughes, 1995:416)

Introduction: Does evil not concern us?
At a PhD-course at the University of Bergen I was - together with Fredrik Barth - discussant
on a paper on female circumcision in Gambia. The paper showed that such practices var
from the mildest to the most severe forms. I argued that female circumcision is morally
wrong, and wanted to discuss the role of our own attitudes as well as our moral
responsibilities in facing cruelty and suffering. Most of the others in the group argued,
however, that we should never impose one value system upon another. Fredrik Barth asked
me the following: how can I know that female circumcision is wrong if I haven't been there to
study it?
I do not accuse Barth of supporting female circumcision. Ris argument is a theoretical
and methodological one connected to the dynamic and constitution of Social Anthropology.
Stil I fin d the argument both morally and theoretically dubious. First, it implies the reduction
of human suffering to academia. Medical research shows that female circumcision is both
painful, partly or fully destroys sexual pleasure, and may lead to severe physical and
psychological complications. Probably every anthropologist knows this before going to the
field. But does this knowledge become irrelevant as we get to know the involved parties'
possible cultural legitimisation models? The anthropological project here consists in the
researcher - carrying a moral model - facing a context where female circumcision is culturally
legitimated. Does it make good anthropology to pretend that this meeting never took place?
And, would it be an anthropological crime to argue that such practices remain repulsive and
evIl despite playing social and cultural roles?l
Second, whose case are we making in relativising female circumcision or other forms
of human suffering? In our modern times, there is the media. Racism and populist politicians
also present as given facts culturally constructed differences between people. It is highly
doubtful whether a relativistic argument for the understanding of violence and abuse in its
local cultural context wil do any good in combating such attitudes.
Third, what about the victims? What are the moral implications of presenting cultural
justifications for the maltreatment of sexual organs or - when it comes to for example
As a digression, I recently spoke with a young woman from Ghana, who argued that "by not discussing
the moral aspects of such practices, anthropologists become accomplices in the crime. Jf anthropologists do not
join us in our fight against this tradition, they would do better staying at home".
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head-hunting - the chopping off of heads? Aren't we here on a dangerous route, systematising
what is perhaps not so systematised or localising something which is perhaps not so entirely
local?
Fourth, if e.g. female circumcision, head-hunting or warfare play important cultural
roles among the people we study, does that in itself make these practices acceptable? Is it
particularly surprising that people who practice female circumcision have cultural
justifications for it? If we argue in prosaie terms about head-hunting and its cultural
functions, what about the wars in Bosnia, Rwanda and Palestine? Cultural imagery is
definitely invoked here also. Further, spears are out and machine guns in. The tremendous
"development" when it comes to devastating technology ought to put our relativistic ideas
regarding morality in a terrifying perspective.
My basic arguments could be read as follows: Moral relativism makes anthropology
increasingly peripheral and possibly dangerous. We need to develop our methodologies to be
able to cope more effectively with violence and human suffering.
The latter one leads us to the core of the debate. Row do we do it? What does a
morally engaged anthropology really imply for the anthropologist and the anthropological
project? First, I do not necessarIly con sider it good anthropology to go around telling
informants that what they are doing is wrong. Rather, I wil be introducing a triangular model
of the anthropological project which highlights the concept of dialogue. A continuous
dialogue between the field and the two constitutive components of the anthropological
persona - the academic as well as the more personal relating to ideas, values, and emotions. It
is a model which takes the human being as its point of departure rather than "culture", which
is often a reified construet.
In facing violence, abuse and bestiality, a concept of morality emerges from the
dialogue triangle by recognising the influence of all the angles in the triangle upon the
anthropological project. It may emerge from the personal part of the anthropological persona
facing the suffering victims, refusing the cultural legitimisation given, and telling the
academic not to reduce the suffering to culture and social structure. It is a dialogue with
myself as well as a dialogue with the field. It is an eternally evolving concept.
The issue of what constitutes good and evIl, can obviously be addressed at several
leveIs. My support for working out international standards on human rights is part of my sets
of values, and thus influential within the dialogue triangle. Stil, this paper does not set out to
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qualify a formalised universal ethic. Rather, the perspective presented here is in many ways a
model forwarding an "ethics of proximity" within anthropology. As a paradigm, the ethics of
proximity makes empathy and respect for the human being the cornerstone of human
interaction and communication. Only through empathy am I fully able to understand "the
other" and his/her needs. Only through empathy may I be able to grasp the meaning of
suffering. SocIal science relates to connections, to social structure and organisation, to
culture as collective representation. Only through my emphatetic personal abilties, however,
am I able to relate directly to the compounded human being. Through the dialogue triangle
my values may come to be strengthened, but also challenged for being egocentrically or
ethnocentrically based. AbIlities and values are not immune to change, changes which might
lead to alterations of my scientific models and presentations.
Through this ongoing dialogue exercise, my ethical commtment is formed. Only the
developing understandings from the dialogue can determine the actual scope and shape of
ethical commitments, or the relation between such commitments and "obj ectivity " . A
response to the meeting with human suffering can, within this paradigm, never be
predetermined.
I have divided this paper into three sections. In section one I wil focus on cultural
relativism as a paradigm outlining its potential and actual problems. Further, some possible
political implications of moral relativism in our modem era are discussed. Section two opens
with a discussion of social science - in general and anthropology in particular - and ethics. It
is argued that we can hardly hope to eradicate the influence of values upon our science. A
more honest and effective anthropology might come, first, from greater openness around such
issues, and, second, from redefining the role of values from obstacles or problems to research
assets. Further, some anthropological inputs to morality are introduced and discussed,
including a debate between Roy D'Andrade and Nancy Scheper-Hughes on the moral-
objective dichotomy. This debate continues in the last section, where I wil tentatively be
addressing the issue of alternative procedural agendas to deal more effectively and sincerely
with matters of evil and human suffering.
1. Moral relativism: Opening eyes or blinding them?
The anthropological literature abounds with examples of how violence is played out, and
which functions it has.
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Napoleon Chagnon's (1977) account of the Yanomamö - "the fierce people" - has
always been an important introduction to anthropology at the University of Bergen. Chagnon
presents the Yanomamö as very violent. Violence is used by men internally in the vilage, it is
used against men from other vilages, and it is used particularly harshly against women both
internally and externally. Women are regularly beaten with axes or stieks, they are abducted
and raped2.
Stil, the question of morality is strikingly absent. Rather, violent behaviour is
considered an integral part of being a person the Yanomamö way, and thus culturally
functional or socially constructive. Likewise with Michelle Rosaldo's (1980, 1984) account of
male head-hunters telling about the personally and socially enriching aspects of collecting and
displaying heads.
Regarding the Yanomamö, more recent studies have been conducted (Lizot, 1994)
de-emphasising the role of violence in the society. Keesing (1987, 1989a, 1989b) has
repeatedly argued that we should be careful with endowing the different "exotic" culture traits
discovered in a given context with too much independent functional agency. They might
reflect relations of dominance, external influence, or anthropological exoticism. In stri ving
for relativity, the project may in fact turn in on itself and become ethnocentric. For why is it
that we have complicated power and social relations whilst they "only" have culture? Stil,
regarding the lack of focus on morality in such studies of violence, most anthropologists have
kept sIlent (but see Spiro, 1984). The basic cultural relativist construetion of our science
makes it difficult to enter into a moral debate about cultural practices.3
I believe one of the reasons can be found in a logical shortcoming inherent to the very
paradigm of cultural relativism, where an idea of the relativity of morality seems to follow
logically from an ethically neutral methodological principle. To avoid this fallacy, the
paradigm of cultural relativism should be divided into several distinet parts. The first one,
methodological cultural relativism, does not relate directly to issues of morality, but rather
represents a principle, a guide to effective anthropology. Methodological cultural relativism
insists that acts and practices should be studied in the locality from where they emanate, in
their local context. The rationale for such an approach would be that without an adequate
understanding of the natural and social predicaments and possibilities human beings in
2 According to Chagnon, the wives accept their oppression and argue that men who do not give them an
axe blow now and then do not love them. Logically, if you cary scars on your head, you have a caring and
loving husband.
3 Kapferer, 1988, would be an example of a basically non-relativistic treatment of warfare and violence.
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different localities face, we would hardly be able to grasp the coherence and logic of any
meaning system or culture. Anthropology's most important achievement would probably be
its demonstration of the enormity of human social and cultural variation. Anthropology has
successfully demonstrated how humans are capable of surviving under and adapting to the
most extreme of circumstances. Our speeies' most important weapon, a weapon we
presumably alone possess, is culture, the webs of significance we attach to our natural and
social environment. Culture is buIlt around propositions and ideas, and used as adaptive
responses to our surroundings.
WhIlst this first understanding can be supported or rejected on purely methodological
grounds, the sec ond understanding, which I - laeking a better term - choose to call reified
cultural relativism, plays a significant role in producing the logical fallacy of the blende d
paradigm of cultural relativism. This form of relativism reduces the human being to a reified
"culture" or "society". The transition from methodology to morality takes place when
contextualfactors go from being explanations tojustifications. Context - the social, political
and cultural environment - becomes justification for killing, for rape, for molestation, and so
often through our history for warfare. When oppression, abuse and violence are presented and
defended as socially and culturally functional, no moral charges can be brought against the
human perpetrators.
Reification of contextual factors opens up for the final building block of the entire
paradigm: moral relativism.4 Traditionally, this position has it that as cultural practices are
locally and contextually based, they are immune to external critique. The way the position has
been communicated, this immunity may have important consequences. First, cultural
practices - bein g cultural and contextual - can in themselves not be subject to moral
evaluations.5 No practice is in any way "better" than another. Second, the anthropologist is not
entitled to enforce another standard upon a particular culture, evaluative anthropology makes
bad anthropology. Human beings only become morally accountable to their own groups and
meaning systems.
Reified and moral relativism - both relating to values - do not follow logically from
the methodoIogical principle. Refraining from evaluations as much as possible might bea
4 It should be emphasised that the concept of moral relativism at the outset was formulated as areaction
against colonialism and racism. As such it sought to show how so called "barbarie customs" should be
understood as being components of complex social and cultural connections.
5 Shweder (1984) exemplifies this position when he claims that the only way we can evaluate people who
emphatise with starving Armenians in relation to head-hunters is by arguing that they are "obviously different".
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methodologically wise thing to do, but it does not follow from the anthropological project.
Even though cultural practices should be understood in local context, why should that make
them immune to critique? We should be very cautious in making moral judgements. If
cultural practices, however, include kiling, physical abuse, suppression of weak groups, etc.,
it is probably even more problematie to pretend that the moral problems do not exist.
There isanother, perhaps even more tragic, fallacy here. Moral relativism within
anthropology often presupposes ideas of mutuality, of dignity and respect for the other. First,
this is, as I have argued above, a moral argument in itself. Second, and more importantly, it is
often a reified and animated view of culturt which constitutes this "other". It is this entity we
pay our respect to. This may be praiseworthy in itself, but what about the human beings who
become victims of physical or sexual abuse legitimated according to the inherent ideas of the
culture we praise? What do we make of their cry for dignity, their cry for mutual respect?
Implicit in the argument that cultural practices are outside the realm of moral judgement, is
another argument - in itself moral, and perhaps not as beautiful - which states that culture
takes precedence to the individual, to misery and suffering.
Further, what would be a moral relativist response to the globalisation of violence?
Communities which anthropologists studied by the use of harmony models, find themselves
engaged in bloody war. Cruelty and ideas of cruelty travel. As Tambiah (1989) has shown, the
spread of modern arms is also an integral part of globalisation proeesses.
With technological development tasks become easier. Stil the act remains the same
even if the technology changes. For the slain, knife or machine gun makes no real difference.
As dead objects technologies are beyond morality. Changing dead objects does not make the
action more or less moraL.
Anthropologists have traditionally been struggling for small and weak communities
and groups facIng encroachment from more powerful political actors. However, when it
comes to intern al violence and suppression, modernisation in away exposes our dubious
moral record. Anthropologists have also been accused of presenting the socIal view of the
powerful - men, the wealthy, the chief - as they perhaps possess a "comprehensive" social
view more fit for anthropological presentation. The result of the merging of these two trends
might very well be that the anthropologist himself becomes an accompliee in legitimising
human suffering (see Scheper-Hughes, 1995).
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Culture should ideally be a neutral concept. The practice, however, is often that the
concept becomes positively charged. Morally questionable practices easily become acceptable
as they are cultural; the cultural becomes beautiful and functionaL.
Moral relativism may lead to exaggeration, the produetion of functionality and
coherence where there is none, and, ultimately, the transformation of ugliness to beauty.
Daniel (1991) uses the metaphor of the blind spot in the eye as his point of entranee to
the study of torture and pain. We, as anthropologists, have an urge to explain everything, to
give all social life modular form. War and human misery are no exceptions. By trans forming
terrible suffering to textual models, we create beauty from eviL. Stil the blind spot is there.
When we feel fully confident about our interpretations, the spot stays almost invisible.
However, in the presenee of suffering it grows - through our feelings of uneasiness - to the
point of almost blinding us. We feel obliged to give human suffering modular shape. Stil we
hesitate: did I really understand what those people are going through? Did I really gras p the
meaning of the story that young man was tellng about his experiences in the torture
chamber?
The blind spot represents that which cannot be properly understood, cannot be
reduced to structure and function, cannot be reduced to culture or eventually text. We should
become more honest and sincere in the presenee of human suffering.
2. Ethics, morality and anthropology: Problems and possible solutions
The relation between anthropology and morality has never been an easy one. Wolfram
(1988: 108) argues that "morality proper ... has been neglected (among anthropologists)" .
Pocock (1986:7) simply states that "anthropologists have not be en interested (in morality)".
Stil, there is more to this thanjust "interests". The inherent logical fallacy of cultural
relativism has been influential in preventing us from addressing moral issues. Further, almost
no problem has been more difficult for the social sciences in general than the question of
ethics, of good and bad. Is ethics beyond social science, or is it an integral part of it?
Barnett (1988: 21-22) represents the dominant Western view of science when he
argues:
Science as we define it in our culture is not designed to validate ethical postulates. Ethical postulates state
that a particular action or belief is better (either absolutely or in relationship to some specified criterion)
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than some other behaviour or belief. Ethics deal with issues of good and bad, a domain of discourse that
hes outside the domain of science.
Nevertheless, it is generally recognised (see e.g. Hellevik, 1987:383-392) that values
influence the research proeess in several ways. A particular research object is chosen first
according to the specific interests and the political (as well as ethical) values of the
researcher; second, through selectivity and interpr~tation during the research proeess; and
third, through the selective presentation of data. Thus, in one way or another, values do
influence socIal science. It is, however, by many considered a value in itself to limit this
influence as much as possible.
Unfortunately, in practice this often implies rejecting or refraining from relating to it
altogether in textual presentations. For anthropologists - using their own bodies, emotions and
social capabilities as research tools - the relation between science and ethics is a matter of the
. utmost importance: how can we counter the influence of values by the use of what perhaps
some would argue is such an unreliable instrument? The obvious answer would be that
positivism and anthropology do not go together well. Values are too deeply embedded in our
science. Our data are rarely quantifiable. They are created by being filtered through our very
persons. Even though another anthropologist decides to question my work through using
exactly the same persons as I did as informants, there is no guarantee that they would relate
to him in the same way as they did to me. The relation between the world as it exists out there
and the world as it is presented in an anthropological text is long and winding indeed.
The way out of this predicament lies, first, in fully recognising it - thus becoming
more honest. This is the reflexive approach. Second, it lies in turning the whole debate to our
own advantage. Values are research assets, they can be put to direct and active use. As long as
values are integral to the entire constitution of the anthropological project, this provides us
with the opportunity to reject the archaic view that they are necessarIly anathema to science.
In its suspension of moral judgement, the paradigm of moral relativism may on the
surface be read as a "neutral" and "objective" concept. However, in the end it turns out to be a
highly moral quest. In its heart it carries concepts like mutuality, mutual respect, dignity.
Norms claiming validity pervade our object areas.
The entire anthropological encounter is in itself a moral encounter. Through our
meetings with our research subjects we utilise our entire persona, our scientific models of ten
blend with emotions and interpretations whose origins cannot be reduced to the university.
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We develop friendly relations, again utilising more of ourselves than we present in our texts.
"The other" influences me as I do with him in a continuing dialogue.
Again, dialogue is the keyword to an ethically committed anthropology. WhIlst norms
emphasising respect and dignity for the other do not fit in with an "objective" moral
relativism rejecting evaluations, they may come to mature in the anthropological encounter
itself. Our encounter is not primarIly with "culture", it is with human beings. It is the human
being who deserves mutuality, respect and dignity. We need a concept of morality which
makes the human bein g the point of departure, a concept - created and ever developing
through dialogue - which in the face of culturally legitimated oppression and abuse is an
antithesis of moral relativism. "Cultures" should in my view be "holy" only to the extent that
they function to provide the human being with the space to live a life in dignity. "Culture"
should never be an excuse for oppression.
The individual human bein g is also the point of entry into understanding culture as
some form of collective representation. To show respect for the individual may thus of ten
imply showing respect for a cultural collective. Through focus on socialisation proeesses,
anthropology has demonstrated how human beings gradually develop skils in mastering
cultural ideas and symbols, and grow into becoming full-fledged members of a particular
community. Such internalisation and mastering of symbols - essential assets for all human
beings - is in a way the collective represented through the individuaL. However, the view of
the pluralone gets from proceeding from the singular is seldom coherent and orderly . The
relation between individual and collective may be one of contradiction and outright verbal
and physical force. The different forms of sanctions applied by a collective to make the
individual conform, may reveal a lot about this collective. Jf our primar ethical commitment
is to the human being, we thus have a perfectly legitimate opening for making evaluations
about the particular collective of which he/she is a part.
Following such a methodology in my own work on inter-ethnic conflet, inter-ethnic
dialogue and enemy images in Israel-Palestine (Lønning 1995a, 1995b), I have shown that
collective cultural meaning systems on both sides contribute significantly to the widening of
the conflct and continuing blood-shed. A lasting peace is dependent upon culture change.
In our dealings with human beings in an often grisly world, we need to be able to
argue that peace is better than war and that eating is better than starving. We need to develop
our methodologies to be able to address evIl at face value.
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2.1 Morality as research object: A brief look at the Iierature
I have already argued that morality was never an anthropological favourite. Relativism has
also limited the scope of the few contributions made by anthropologists.
An example can be found in a volume on anthropology and human rights edited by
Downing and Kushner, 1988. The position forwarded here is very "traditional", and very
much based on the "small is beautiful" argument. Scale becomes an important variable in
determining whether an act can be said to represent a breach of human rights. I include a
passage from the work of Schirmer (1988) to exemplify:
The scalp or human head is not equivalent to the combat stripe ... for the lack of congruency between
small warring bands with spears and knives and "special counterinsurgency forces" ... who slaughter
thousands of unarmed civilians. (ibid. 97)
There is nothing untrue about this assertion if scale is our only variable. Small is not
the same as big. However, to Schirmer, the argument is moral: slaughtering thousands is
morally wrong, taking scalps and human heads is at least less morally wrong. Further, it is a
cultural thing and thus partly beyond the scope of moral judgement.
Pocock (1986) attacks anthropology for not focusing on morality. His own approach
does not relate to evaluations, but is rather an attempt to treat moral thinking as an objective
phenomenon. To Pocock morality is a way of thinking about human existential problems. It is
the individual's way of sorting out the different predicaments and alternatives facing his life.
It is human reflection, and thus much more than the set of codes and conventions we usually
collect. It is personality versus society and collective c1aims. This is the universality of
morality, this is also Pocock's critique of cultural relativism. In our focus on "cultures", we
have overemphasised the categorical meaning of boundaries, he argues. He is sceptical to
inside-outside, and us and them dichotomies, and argues that: "(tJhe apparent distinetion
between the human and the sub-human might be better represented as a distinetion between
the human and the human-not-quite-our-type" (ibid. 14). Categorisations are responses to
moral dIlemmas and alternatives, but do not necessarIly imply that we exc1ude the not so
favoured in our categorisations from the moral universe of humanity. Instead he favours
comparing inside-outside dichotomies with intern al dichotomies made for example between
the sexes.
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The reasoning here is vague, and so is the message. It is not particularly surprising that
people everywhere face moral dilemmas. Neither is Pocock's conclusion very innovative,
when he states that upon recognising the role of moral thinking in social life "this of course
wil have uncomfortable consequences for us when we are obliged to recognise that moral
thinking informs behaviour which we may at the very best despise" (ibid. 18). Interviews
with former N azis, as well as writings from Nazi leaders, show that the extermination of the
Jews was in many ways conceived of as a morally good act determined to save the human
race from "pollution". This is moral thinking producing massive immorality. History abounds
with further examples of dehumanising moralities which ought to tell us that the moral
fortresses - based on enemy images (see below) - people construet between us and them
cannot be reduced to intern al differentiations.
Samuel Fleischacker (1994) is strictly spe akng no anthropologist. Stil his approach is
very "anthropological" in taking on the concept of culture as the point of departure for his
discussion of morality . Moralities are visions of the ultimate good, Fleischacker argues, and
as such, they are borne and developed through different cultural constructions. Fleischacker
rejects traditional universalism. Universal moralities cannot address the individual in his daily
life, he argues. They are too vague. Only God knows the ultimate good. The good life for
man, according to Fleischacker, is the life spent in seeking for the good life of man. Thus be
introduces the concept of tradition. Traditions are stories about what the ultimate good is and
how to strive for it. They are stories about our group and how to be a member of it. As such
they mediate between private conceptualisations and the ultimate good. Traditions give local
answers to existential problems.
Culture is for Fleischacker a meaning system built up around such stories and a set of
authorities to convey them and apply them in the real world. As such culture is morality, as it
is the frame which provides the moral questions and answers. Stories trigger and potentially
satisfy the individual search for meaning to life and in life. The meaning of a story can only .
be found by living it out.
This is Fleischacker's universality. The search for the ultimate good, never to find it,
but always grasping more of it. It is always a locally situated quest.
Stil, Fleischacker does not resist the temptation to become more specific. Only a few
stories (he mentions Nazism) can, according to him, be exc1uded from the following
definition:
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for anything to count as a morality or ethical code: it must be action guiding, ideal based, overridingly
important, directed toward a conceivable end, accompanied by a conception of "personhood" that does
not severely conflict with our own, and not aimed toward the degradation or destruction of any being
fitting that conception of "person" (1994:19)
This is a description of culture conceptualised as a set of moral stories. As a theory of
culture, it is also a universally applicable model.
Fleischacker distances himself from moral relativism if this implies the rejection of
the possibIlity of intervention in another culture. Intervention is possible, according to
Fleischacker, as the general frame around which culture is built is universaL. Intervention
should nevertheless be based on principles intern al to the culture in question. Are there
themes within the culture which resemble ideas about freedom from oppression, rejection of
sexual and physical abuse, etc.? In most cultures there are, he argues, and intercultural
dialogue means expanding such themes to the benefit of all sides.
Intervention should nevertheless always be the last option. Cultures are moralities, and
"ours" is not better than "theirs". Moral systems may, however, become distorted:
We may regard an entire society as having distorted its own ethical tradition into an inhumane version of
itself if
(1) we can see that the society has been subjected to external pressures threatening its very survival
(members of any culture can lose their ability to concern themselves with ethical judgement when they
live in fear of murder and starvation);
(2) we can locate a larger cultural structure, extending back before the pattern of actions we want to
condemn, to which we can appeal as a more solid, long-term identification of the culture; and
(3) we can find clear signs, preferably independent of the practices to which we are objecting, that trust in
the structure of authorities which normally carries the culture from one generation to the next has broken
down (1994:172).
If these conditions are met, intervention is ethically COITect. Again Fleischacker mentions
N azi Germany as an example.
Still, the theory of Fleischacker partly rests on a flawed idea of the world as well as of
culture and tradition. Takng the latter first, it is very much a primordialist argument. It rests
on the premise that, in a healthy cultural system, stories and authorities survive over the
generations. Obviously, continuity is an element which should be addressed, and which wil
very of ten be found within certain cultural traditions. However, if one argues that even within
a perfectly healthy culture and society change is more prevalent than continuity, that stories
are invented and circumvented (see e.g. Handler and Linekin, 1984, Keesing, 1989a), that
authorities and authority systems fall and new and different ones emerge, the theory becomes
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more problematie. Furthermore, how do we know that previous patterns are more "solid" than
contemporary ones?
The world is also changing. One aspect of modernity is the produetion and
dissemination of metanarratives on morality. Freedom from oppression, self-rule and human
rights is one such narrative. These provide models for locally produced stories and ideas. One
aspect of nationalism and other forms of sectarianism is the reinterpretation of loe al stories to
become one version of the metanarrative. Local tradition is thus only one variable in a much
more complicated picture.
Further, Fleischacker's definition of morality does not fit well with our contemporar
violent and sectarian world. Many contemporary stories conveying identity stress the opposite
i
of his definition. By the use of enemy images they do degrade other humans, they even reject
their humanity altogether (see below for a further discussion of enemy images). Instead of
buIlding open moral universes we are bUIlding moral fortresses, where culturally constructed
identity is the only entranee ticket.
Fleischacker remains within the domain of relativism in providing so much
independent agency to culture and tradition, arguing that the individual is only morally
accountable to such reitïed constructs. As evIl is globalising, this view does not bring us
much further. His is basically a descriptive account of morality . That is, he tries to find the
morality existing out there already. This is praiseworthy, but the world of Fleischacker is
basically a tranquIl moral world. The world of the seven o'clock news is a world of violence,
torture and hate.
Let us thus turn to Wolfram (1982), who in his essay "Anthropology and morality", is
particularly preoccupied with "Utilitarianism", a direction he claims provides a point of
departure for anthropological empirical research.
Quite briefly, utilitarians argue that "acts are morally right in proportion as they
promote happiness, morally wrong in so far as they do the reverse" (ibid. 262-263).
Wolfram expands this simplistic version into a relational and social concept. A major
emphasis is put on all concerned. Morality is what constitutes human society. This means that
we are not only talking about the actor and his counterpart, but also the wider ramifications.
In fact, what is at issue is the amount of happiness or misery a certain human act brings to
human sociality or community. This is the criterion for judging an acts moral content.
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The empirical task, "discounting factual error and idiocy" (ibid. 274), actually
becomes the most important. It implies "following the loops" (Bateson, 1972) of different acts
to try to grasp their wider ramifications, a task anthropologists are well qualified to do.
Stil, the utilitarian concept is open to attack from several angles. Most obvious are
the problems of "counting" the distribution of happiness or misery within a certain socIal field
stemming from a particular act. And, what is happiness really? How do we measure it?
Utilitarianism can also be accused of promoting blatant egotism. The original
developers of the concept, phIlosophers like David Hume, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mil did not reject the proposition that individuals could act to serve their own self interest, if
on ly the act could be seen as maximising the good of alL. Wuthnow (1991) demonstrates how
many Americans in volve d in charity work utilise this vers ion of utilitarianism as the
rationalisation - "it makes me feel good" - for their involvement. Utilitarianism is thus hardly
a concept suitable for promoting dignity of and mutual respect for the human being.
Utilitarianism is reductionist in its treatment of the individuaL. It does not pay attention to the
totality of the individual, his/her life-world and his/her inherent moral capabilities.
Within phIlosophy itself, the so-called "ethics of pro xi mit y " - as a moral discourse -
can be read as a strong critique of utilitarianism. WhIlst the concept of the person is more or
less absent within utilitarianism, the human being is the point of departure for the ethics of
proximity. A basic emphasis is put on emotions as moral phenomena.
Deducting empirically researchable hypotheses from the fundamental premises of an
ethics of proximity is not an easy task. While utilitarianism is a theory of what constitutes a
morally good or evil act, the ethics of proximity is much more than that. It is a theory of man.
Two Norwegian proponents, Vetlesen and Nortvedt (1994), claim that the human
being is equipped with a fundamental capacity for empathy - stemming from and essential for
human sociality. It is a human characteristic to empathise and sympathise with the other's
situation. The moral field is the field of empathy, and empathy is the most basic of our
emotions. In that way the human is a moral creature.
Ethics ofproximity (Lévinas, 1985, Løgstrup, 1991, 1993, Baumann, 1993, Vetlesen
and Nortvedt, 1994) asserts that the simple human encounter is per se a moral encounter.
Meeting "the other" challenges me. It reveals the other in all his weakness, at the same time
there is a relation of power in the meeting. Through his weakness he gets power over me, the
other's face utters a command, a moral command which forces me to relate to the ultimate
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moral challenge, do I respond or do I turn away? Løgstrup and Lévinas argue that the moral
challenge is pre-existent, it cannot be explained through epistemology, or through logical
rationalisation. The ultimate challenge (Løgstrup, 1991) was created with man, and is
intimately connected to the being of man in the world.
Bauman (1993) demonstrates how this challenge is everywhere and nowhere. In one
sense it is thereby universal, but it is nevertheless fundamentally anti-universal in its lack of
capacity to produee universally valid ethical rules and norms. It is anti-authoritarian, and
cannot be questioned. It is social, meaning inter-human, but comes before "society" and
"culture". As morality in this sense cannot be turned into law, there are no established recipes
of morally correct behaviour. There are only eternal questions. "Did I do enough? Could I
have done more?" These problems are raised through every human meeting and can never be
solved. Bauman c1aims that the times through which we are passing - which he calls
post-modernity - on one level are characterised by rebellion against existing political
structures, organisations and laws. "Identity" has become fluid, and instead of talking about
political systems we would do better talking about meetings and contexts. Thus he labels
post-modernity the age of morality, as it enhances the individual's capability of listening to
the ultimate challenge.
However, theory and practice have never seemed to be further ahead than on this
point. Listening to the daIly news, "the age of moral it y" is not the first one thinks about. Our
times might perhaps provide the opportunities, but humanity does not se em to have grasped
them yet. Humanity seems to have developed the utmost expertise in destroying the morality
stemming from the other's face. We destroy the human capacity for empathy through our
cultural constructions. Our often diabolical us-versus-them construetions are images, they do
not exist in the natural world. Enemy images bolster intern al unit y within our group but at the
same time deprive the other of his humanity.
On this point, anthropology has a lot to offer. The anthropological focus on ethnicity
and nationalism could be expanded to include the moral dimension. No human system of
thought has brought more suffering through the ages than our culturally constructed
boundaries between us and them. On one leve! or another, they are integral to all human strife
and war-making. We can hardly be relativist in studying these categories, as they seem to be a
universal property of the human species.
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As such we can do no more than hope to get rid ofthem. We do, however, ne ed more
information about their role in propagating human immorality. Anthropologists have worked
closely with stereotypes of different sorts as systems of orientation in the world, particularly
in multi-cultural societies. On the other hand, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to
enemy images. Enemy images are stereotypes of a different and more malevolent kind. As
Spilmann and Spilmann argue: " ...the function of enemy images corresponds to the function
of stereotypes with the decisive differenee that enemy images dictate orientation whIle
stereotypes help in orienting oneself" (1991:71). Enemy images dehumanise the other, they
blame the evIl on the other, they make him a legitimate object of attack and eradication.
Before us we have a case of cultural dysfunctionality, cultural construetions
destroying human beings and human society, destroying the human capacity for morally good,
and partly relational, thinking. These are cultural proeesses whereby humans are transformed
from moral beings into monsters and killng machines.
2.1.1 Objectivity or "the primacy of the ethical": Perspectives on a debate
An interesting debate is conducted in Current Anthropology 36:3 between two leading
scholars of American anthropology, Roy D'Andrade - emphasising objectivity and search for
truths - and Nancy Scheper-Hughes - advocating a more "miltant anthropology" in favour of
the weak and oppressed.
Scheper-Hughes seeks "to call anthropology's bluff, to expose its artificial moral
relativism and to try to imagine what forms a politically committed and morally engaged
anthropology might take" (1995:410). Scheper-Hughes argues, as I have done, that the idea of
moral relativism is partly outdated and partly dangerous in our violent world oftoday.
Anthropology, "if it is to be worth anything at all, must be ethically grounded" (ibid. 410).
She c1aims that participant observation means involvement if you want any feedback
from your surroundings. People who live on the point of starvation have, naturally enough,
problems understanding the meaning of the observing neutral anthropologist. Similarly, the
field-situation in itself breeds involvement, it breeds empathy. Involvement thus becomes
both an ethical commitment as well as a natural aspect of fieldwork. She sums up the project
of the morally engaged anthropologist in the following paragraph:
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While the anthropologist is always a necessarily flawed and biased instrument of cultural translation, like
every other craftsperson we can do the best we can with the limited resources we have at hand: our ability
to listen and to observe carefully and with empathy and compassion (ibid. 418).
D'Andrade (1995) advances the continuation of objectivity, although recognising that
science is not "unbiased". D'Andrade's main point is that a moral model cannot be empirically
tested whilst an objective one can. The separation of subject and object has been one of the
main triumphs of science. A moral model, however, builds on the values of the observer, thus
making it outside the realm of proper science. Anthropology should find truths, not fight
them.
His main point can be summarised by the following passage:
The experience of people trying to find out about how the world works is that you find out more when
you avoid the use of evaluative terms - otherwise you spend all your time arguing about the use of these
terms, trying to make the bad things get the bad words and the good things get the good words (ibid. 406).
D'Andrade claims that anthropologists involved in moral studies simplify what
oppression is, where it comes from, and how it can be combated.
Thus, D'Andrade gives us several examples where he believes the moral model wil
fail in providing a proper account. He asks:
Is taking away the freedom of serial murderers oppression? Most people would say that it is not - that
they deserve to have their freedom taken away, and that it is prudent to do so as well. Is it not oppression,
then, if the people bein g dominated deserve to be dominated or need to be dominated for the common
good. But who is to say who deserves to be dominated? And who is to say what the common good is?
(ibid. 405)
Further, D'Andrade distances himself from relativism, but stil utilises relativist
arguments in his attacks on moral models. Consider the following:
Finally, the current moral model is ethnocentric. It is strong for equality (the escape from inequality) and
freedom (the release from oppression). In my view these are not bad values, but they are very American.
These are not the predominant values of modem Japan, India, China, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia,
but they are the predominant values in the United States and much of Europe. It is ironic that these
moralists should be so colonialist in their assumption about what evil is (ibid. 408).
In my view, these arguments are not convincing. Even though the case about serial
murderers is a metaphor for the complexities and difficulties involved in making a moral
judgement, it is not a good one as such.6 It do es not reflect the realities of Scheper-Hughes'
6 To me it is in fact as far-fetched as reminding me of the question I was asked during the obligatory
17
oppressed and starving informants in BraziL. The only "crime" most of them have done is to
be born.
Furthermore, D'Andrade seriously misrepresents Scheper-Hughes and her focus on the
involvement and compassion created through fieldwork. My reading of her would rather
emphasise the following question: in our personal meetings with victims of violence, with
people on the point of starvation, how can we avoid dealing with moral issues?
And, to respond more directly to the questions raised: The people living out there are
to say what the common good is. Y ou are to say it. I am to say it. This is what we do, we are
all discussing it, and this discourse is also what anthropology should reflect.
The argument in the last quote, forwarded without any empirical evidence, can - if
presented by for example a right-wing politician - be read as partly racist. Whoever decided
that fighting against inequality and oppression are particularly American ideas? Are "they"
any more happy about oppression than "we" are? What about the Kashmiris in India, the
students at Tianmen Square in China, the guerrilas in the Middle East, the people of Burma?
A political culture is not necessarily the same as the culture of the people. Even
though there is a political tradition of autocracy and oppression within a certain region, it
does not necessarily mean that the people like being dominated.7
Further, people are not stupid. With the spre ad of new systems of communication,
oppressed peoples see and hear that others lead better lives. Thus, despite liv ing within
hierarchical cultural systems, they also seek better lives for themselves. Should we refuse
them the possibIlities of hearing about others' lives? Should we continue exporting them coca
cola and soap operas while censoring ideas of freedom from oppression?
Ideologies of resistance and human rights are ever widening discourses. At the same
time the borders or boundaries - separating the poor from the rich and the free from the
oppressed - in fact become strengthened as the politieal, cultural and economic capital of
police interview following my refusal of miltary service: "Y ou don't want to kill people", the inspector said,
"but did you ever kil fles, mosquitoes or wasps?" "No", Ireplied, knowing that any other answer might do
serious harm to my application.
7 Personally I was accused of imposing my values on another culture after publicly criticising the lack of
democracy in the recent Palestinian election campaign. Stil, my experience from fieldwork in Palestine is that
people do not fancy oppression. They are seriously preoccupied with it and frustration is growing over the many
signals that the newadministration is becoming very traditionally "Arab" on these issues. The democratie
fundaments created during the Intifada have come under serious attack as the new rulers coming in from the
outside are becoming more "Egyptian-like", "Syrian-like", "Iraqi-like". Newspapers now have two censors, the
workload of human rights activists has doubled.
18
modernity is concentrated on fewer and fewer hands. As aresult people rebel, resulting in the
immense growth of ideologies of self-rule and nationalism.
I have another problem with D'Andrade's argumentation, namely his emphasis on
"finding truth" . This positivist assertion is not easy to reconcile with anthropology's basically
interpretative constitution. In a world so full of "complex webs of causes", as well as
interpretations - what constitutes truth? D'Andrade argues that when using moral models, the
researcher's own model wil be the determining factor. But does not this go for "truth" as
well? Ultimately it wil be the scientists own version of truth which wil prevail in his
presentations. Is "truth" really objective whilst morality is merely subjective? How can one
know that the theoretical construets of D'Andrade (e.g. 1984, 1987, 1992), reflect a more true
world than Scheper-Hughes' accounts of human misery and suffering?
We are dealing with human beings, not numbers and stones. Pairing truth with
anthropology hardly produces a lively offspring. The best we can do is to search for our
version( s) of truth through dialogue and discourse.
Stil, D'Andrade has a point in warning against political involvement in the field.
Studying dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, interfering with personal opinions during
a dialogue session would have destroyed my project (see Lønning, 1995a). Although I must
admit that I admire Scheper-Hughes for doing it, I do not necessarily agree with her when she
argues that anthropologists should become companheiras - involved in the battle against
oppression with their subjects. It might become inevitable, but personal engagement in the
lives of the human beings we meet would be a more comprehensive detinition of an ethically
commtted anthropology. We are ethically committed to the suffering people who open their
lives for us to enhance our academic careers. But only through the dialogue triangle can our
commitment be moulded.
We need to be more open to the different moral impulses of the field situation, to the
way we face the field situation and the happiness and misery communicated to us, to the way
we interpret and respond. We need to become - using a popular contemporary term - more
reflexive, more reflexive in the way we use ourselves as research instruments and barometers
in the field. The last part of this paper deals with this issue.
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3. Listening to multiple voices
Then, taking the reflexive critique of anthropology into account (Clifford and Mareus, 1986,
as well as Marcus and Fisher, 1986, are some of the best known proponents of this critique),
how should we go about becoming more "honest" in our work. Our method par excellence is
participant observation. However, when one reads much anthropology, there is very little
about the participant part. I1's as though the anthropologist has been a walking tape recorder,
seeing, but not being seen and noticed. Stil, the information goes through her, she filters it by
the use of her own filters, she transcribes it into anthropological language. At one leve! or
another, anthropology is an interpretative quest.
The field experience is as dynamic as it is fascinating. For the anthropologist, it is an
interplay between experiences, interpretations and emotions. The anthropologist uses his own
personality as his research tool. His personality in the field has at least two components, one
truly personal and one academic. The context wil of ten decide which aspect is emphasised in
his presentation of self. Sometimes the two c1early separate, sometimes they mingle. For the
informant, relating to the anthropologist is not easier. The anthropologist must walk the
tightrope between friend and researcher, the informer between friend and informant ("does he
mingle with me because I am me, or because he needs the information I can provide"?).
Anthropologists are dependent up on friends, but friendship is a two-way proeess. It involves
giving and taking, it involves intluencing the other and his actions and words. Friendship
does not work if only the other talks. I have to talk as well. I have to give my opinions, and
my opinions wil influence the other person as his wil mine.
Scheper-Hughes (1995) makes a distinetion between observation and witnessing. The
first one is associated with the natural sciences, the latter with moral philosophy. An
anthropologist getting seriously involved in the lives of his subjects, is much more a witness
than an observer, she argues. The anthropologist thus becomes amessenger:
... participant-observation has a way of drawing ethnographers into spaces of human life where they might
really prefer not to go at all and, once there, do not know how to escape except through writing, which
wily-nily draws others there as well, making them party to the witnessing (ibid. 419).
Most anthropologists, I would guess, participate and intluence their field. That is, up
to the point of representation. Then this influence disappears, as does the anthropologist
himself - inc1uding his ad hoc interpretations and emotions. I have of ten found myself
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wondering whIle reading an anthropological account of some rather bizarre and violent ritual
or act: "What did you feel when you witnessed this? Did you manage to keep your scientific
and personal interpretations of it totally separate when taking notes and contextualising? How
much of yourself is there - unwritten - in your formalised functional presentations? Or does
perhaps the personal part of your anthropological persona disappear as the material goes from
your fieldnotes to the text as the current paradigm tells you that it is none of your business to
feel anything at all?"
Looking back at my own fieldwork periods, these are troubling questions. Reflexivity
leads me to acknowledge that I may have done violence to the magic of the field situation. It
is the meeting between the anthropologist - carrying his double persona - and the field which
creates anthropology. If one, then, exc1udes vital aspects of this meeting - the interpretations
and emotions of the person behind the anthropological mask - important data is lost. 8
The anthropologist sometimes presents himself to the field as a "friend" - or using
other personal characteristics, maybe even "enemy" - sometimes as a scientist, sometimes
both. The field, in return, responds to him in the same way. Sometimes it engages his
non-academic persona - carrying its cultural ideas and images - sometimes his academic. This
interplay is bound to affect research in one way or another. To utilise it more consciously
would create a more honest anthropology. The dialogue triangle (Figure 1) shows this
interplay of forces between the anthropologist and his field:
The field
Figure 1
The person The scientist
Lavie, 1990, tries to deal with this duality by ubiquitously separating between "I" and "anthropologist"
in her study of Bedouins in the Sinai. After witnessing a ritual of Clitoridectomi she writes: "... I stop being an
anthropologist, and throw myselfupon the shore, vomiting and crying, vomiting and crying ..." (ibid. 146).
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Jf this is the field situation, why should we destroy it in our representations? Our
science needs renewal as our challenges change. Renewal comes through liberation from
established conventions and paradigms. It comes from reflexivity, from opening up to new
voices - inc1uding our own. Jf we use ourselves as research tools, there should be no reason
why we should not use ourselves - reflexively - as research barometers (see Cohen, 1994).
Further, it comes from applying concepts dynamically in the field - what they mean to
"them" , what they mean to "us" - instead of just reserving them for the representational part.
Anthropological fieldwork and representation is exactly that - listening to multiple voices.
Sometimes my personal interpretations might collide with my academic ones. As both are
part of my anthropological persona, I have to listen to them, reconcile them, or perhaps
explain why they are irreconcilable. At other times, the concepts and interpretations of the
people I study might collde with mine. This collision should also be debated.
Multple voices are also present in any community. We cannot assume, at least with
the information flow of today, that the holistic moral version we are told by some
high-ranking figure necessarIly permeates the entire community. As Berreman (1979) has
shown, it is absurd to argue that the outeasts in India willngly accept their subordinate
position.
If only one moral voice is heard - or at least spoken out loud - in the community we
study, we have to explain why. We have to demonstrate relations of domination as well as
their potential hegemonies of meaning. In my previous (Lønning, 1995a, 1995b) as well as
my current work, I am trying to show how, metaphorically, people can become "prisoners" of
their own cultural constructions. Internalised enemy images - in the shape of cultural codes -
in Israel-Palestine, make inter-ethnic dialogue and peace-making an extremely difficult and
risky kind of affair. Several of the members of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue groups I have
studied, have been met with the most extreme of sanctions, even attempted murder. Yitzak
Rabin paid with his life.
There is a collsion between an internalised cultural capital produced during almost a
century of war and the new political situation. How is one to interpret it? Leaders on both
sides have to relate to the sentiments people already hold in their attempts to gain support for
the peace proeess. Israeli leaders speak about getting rid of the fear-producing other through
the establishment of secure borders. Thus the peace proeess leads to the, at least partial,
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fulfilment of Zionism, the pure Jewish state. The new Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak,
recently came up with the following legitimisation:
"Those who have a Greater Land of Israel vision say we should remain involved with the Palestinians
who hate us, Barak said, pointing to Lebanon and Bosnia as examples of where leaving mixed
populations proved disastrous" (Jerusalem Post, 24.11.95: emphasis added).
Clearly - as the paries themselves recognise - peace-making is dependent upon
attitudinal and cultural change.
I believe the metaphor listen ing to multiple voices provides a hole in the closure which
moral relativism has placed in front of our discipline. Having morality off limits as our
working doctrine does not serve us well in the modem world. As the voices multiply, so do
the messages. Today we have an almost global discourse about human rights and ethics.
More and more nations and groups enter this debate. Anthropology has a role to play as some
kind of a mediator in this discourse. Anthropologists should also be messengers carrying
alternative systems of moraIs, as when people in poor countries argue that Western consumer
society is a breach of human rights per se. Naturally, human rights cannot be disconnected
from cultural and social differences. This is what the international debate is about. Human
rights have to be some form of minimum standards, which could be applied in different ways
in different cultural and social settings.
Cultural and social particularities have to be related to in an open dialogue on human
rights. However, to work for a global idea of humanity and dignity we also need to limit
relativism to issues not involving violence and oppression. During my recent participation as
a delegate to the International Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, the representative of
Saudi Arabia delivered a speech to the Commission which I think pin-points the entire
debate: He argued: "We very much support this body and the work it does. Still, in its
approach to Saudi Arabia it exceeds its legitimacy. Saudi Arabia is governed by laws which
were handed to humanity by God through his Prophet. How can we question them? In the
eyes of Saudi Arabia, it is a blasphemy when this Commssion sees itself as capable of
challenging God and his laws."
There is no attempt to reject the charges of extensive use of capital punishment. Stil,
cultural legitimisation makes the perpetrator - in his own eyes at least - immune to criticism.
This is the offcial view of a powerful political actor in the Middle East.
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Thus we need instruments and concepts to initialise the dialogue and bridge the gap.
As we approach the 21st century, the world is, on one level, rapidly becoming one place. Acts
of as well as debates about goodness and evIl are integral to globalisation proeesses.
As the world and the challenges change, so should anthropology.
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